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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Fraud on the Court 
rJn October 21, 1983, attorney John s. Davis was convicted for 
,nLezzling approximately $100,000.00 from his trust account, which money 
lie was holding for the partnership comprised of Defendant-Respondent, 
Charley Joseph, and Plaintiff-Appellant, Joseph Mascaro. It was this act 
of embezzlement by the partnershii:i's attorney, along with attorney 
unscrupulous manipulation, deceit and self dealing, which precipitated this 
lawsuit. Following attorney Davis' theft of the partnershi_e's cash, 
attorney Davis embarked on a scheme to manipulate our judicial system 
through his superior skill, knowledge and training, and by the high position 
of trust he held as an officer of the court. The scheme to defraud the 
court, while not particularly sophisticated, was remarkably successful. 
For nearly a year and a half, he was able to fraudulently manipulate the 
court system to cover up his own felonious activities and deliberately 
prevent his own client, Defendant-Respondent, Joseph, from presenting 
meritorious defenses and counterclaims. Attorney actions, as an 
officer of the Court, constituted a deliberate fraud on the Court of the 
most egregious sort, was a tampering with the administration of justice, 
and is a wrong against the very institutions set up to protect and preserve 
society itself. 
It is vitally important to the proper understanding of this case, and 
its convoluted procedural history in the lower court, to constantly keep in 
rn111d that Mr. Davis, from the day that Plaintif;'s summons was served, 
%ea this lawsuit to attempt to keep his theft hidden. Like a house of 
111J.rrors, nothing is as it appears. What seems to be the simple failure to 
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respond to a summons was in fact the first step in ,, deliberate arid 
intentional scheme to manipulate the judicial procc;ss. 
history of this case is sad testimony of what one u11sc:rupulc1us .11 1,1 'oc:·ll 
dealing attorney can do to abuse and disrupt the legal procc>ss tc.> '-''ver-ur 
his own wrongdoing. A review of the record below clearly reveals 
attorney manipulation of the system to cover-up his theft of the 
partnershi_e' s funds. 
In the early part of 1978, Plaintiff-Appellant, Joseph Mascaro, and 
Defendant- Respondent, Charley Joseph, formed a partnership for the 
purpose of real estate acquisition. There was no written partnership 
agreement. The agreement called for them to split partnership profits on 
a 50/50 basis after expenses had been reimbursed. ( R. 298) The 
partnership then proceeded to attempt to find buyers for the now improved 
property with Defendant-Respondent, Joseph, manning the laboring oar, 
although he and Plaintiff-Appellant, Mascaro, did discuss strategy and 
make necessary decisions together. In fact, in 1977 and 1978 Defendant-
Respondent, Joseph, expended over $10,000.00 in out-of-pocket expenses 
in this effort and diverted sufficient energies and attention from his 
trucking business so that from 1976 to 1978 gross receipts from his 
trucking business fell from $112,001.61 to $45,040.00, and net profits fell 
to $1,595.53. This compares to gross receipts of $124,696.00 and a net 
profit of $29,956.71 in 1979 after he was relieved of most of the 
partnership duties. { R. 301-303) 
The year following the formation of the partnership, some buyers 
presented themselves but none could perform. Finally a deal was 
structured with a Mr. Paul Tanner, but it too stalled. ( R. 300) That was 
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the fateful point at which attorney Johns. Davis injected himself into the 
,,.uun. Even the manner in which attorney Davis injected himself into 
c1tfairs of the Mascaro/Joseph partnership was ethically appalling. 
111s appearance in this matter was indicative of how he was to handle 
tum self unW the court below, by order, forced him to withdraw as counsel. 
However, at the time, Defendant-Respondent, Joseph, and Plaintiff-
Appellant, Mascaro, thought they had found their savior. ( R. 299,300,462) 
Neither partner knew attorney Davis. In the course of his trucking 
business, Defendant- Respondent, Charley Joseph, had hired attorney 
father-in-law to do some work for him on a sub-contract basis. 
When Defendant-Respondent, Joseph, wasl"!'t paid, he had a hard time 
paying Davis' father-in-law. Davis became involved in the collection. 
Defendant-Respondent, Joseph, paid most of the money owed and then 
described his real estate deal that was pending, for which the partnership 
had a buyer, one Paul Tanner, and asked attorney Davis to wait to collect 
the balance unW the partnership real estate deal closed. (R. 299) When 
attorney Davis learned that Defendant-Respondent, Joseph, was involved 
in a good sized real estate deal that was about to close, he became very 
excited and strongly urged Joseph to let him (Davis) represent them in 
closing the deal with Tanner, the buyer. ( R. 299,300,461) Davis claimed 
that he knew Tanner and could make him perform. Defendant-
Respondent, Joseph, met with attorney Davis, and then both partners met 
with attorney Davis. At this second meeting, attorney Davis told them 
that he knew that Tanner was in financial trouble but that he (Davis) 
•"JUld get the money out of Tanner or help them find a new buyer, as he had 
,1 lot of contacts. ( R .299) Based on these representations, the 
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partnership agreed to hire attorney Davis. ( R. Ji10,4n 1) 
What happened over the course of the next three years bee< ·r1.es 0 
case history in the abuse of the professional trust accordood an dUc,rnv:; tJ 1 
his clients and the trust accorded an attorney by the courts by reasori of 
his oath, code of ethics and position as an officer of the court. Initially, 
attorney Davis appeared to work actively to bring to fruition the sale of 
the property. And, as the process drug on, the partners came to rely more 
and more on attorney Davis. ( R.300,461-62) While the process continued 
to drag on, Defendant- Respondent, Joseph, continued to do virtually all of 
the leg work for the partnership, but relied more and more on attorney 
Davis' legal expertise and sophistication to control the transaction. ( R. 
299) Finally a closing with a certain Chatillion, Inc., a Utah corporation 
owned and operated by a Curtis Baum, was arranged. Within a few days of 
the closing, partial consideration in the amount of approximately 
$140,000.00 in cash was received by attorney Davis as a down payment. 
The balance of approximately $240,000.00 due the partnership was to be 
received in the form of eight lots in Weber County represented by Baum to 
have that value. ( R. 300) The original $100,000.00 cash payment was 
placed by attorney Davis into his trust fund. ( R. 300,450) Of that 
amount, Defendant- Respondent, Joseph, directed attorney Davis to give 
$40,000.00 to Taylor, $20,000.00 to Plaintiff-Appellant, Mascaro, 
$20,000.00 to himself (Joseph), and to retain the balance in trust in the 
event of potential legal disputes threatened by Tanner. ( R. 300) Rather 
than doing as directed, attorney Davis issued $20,000.00 to Joseph, and 
unbeknownst to either Mascaro or Joseph, and without their permissior., 
attorney Davis embezzled approximately $100,000.00 of the closing monies 
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to his own use. ( R. 450-460) What then happened would make the most 
, r1r1:al critic of the legal system shudder with disbelief as attorney Davis 
,,,dd"d to himself his knowledge of the legal process to cover-up for as 
Jung as possible his own misconduct, while burying his client in a 
procedural quagmire. 
To understand how he was able to so effectively prevent Defendant-
Respondent, Joseph, from taking the steps that would force the issues to be 
examined on their merits, and necessarily reveal his own self-dealing, one 
must understand the emotional hold that attorney Davis had on Joseph. 
Both Mascaro and Joseph had for the past year put complete trust and 
faith in Davis (R. 300,664) They had increasingly relied on him to handle 
what has become for them something that was too big and complex to 
understand. ( R. 300) As the real estate transaction initiated by the 
Mascaro/Joseph partnership became increasingly complex, Mr. Joseph came 
to rely more and more on Attorney Davif!' superior knowledge and training. 
(R. 300,462, & see pp. 22,29,35,37,40,41.45, Deposition of CharleyJoseph, 
June 18, 1981.) Mr. Joseph was constantly in touch with Attorney Davis 
asking for advice and guidance. Eventually Mr. Joseph relied on Attorney 
Davis to personally handle the negotiations and other details as Attorney 
Davis saw fit. Additionally, Attorney Davis represented Mr. Joseph in 
other legal matters, in which Charley Joseph relied totally on Attorney 
Davis' legal expertise. ( R. 300,462) The fiduciary nature of the 
relationship between Attorney Davis and Mr. Joseph was long term, total 
and complete: Mr. Joseph totally trusted and relied on Attorney Davis. 
1< lien the present lawsuit was commenced, attorney Davis again persuade 
Defendant-Respondent Joseph that he was the only one who knew the facts 
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well enough to properly defend him. (R. 301,462,463) In response to his 
inquiries, Davis kept reassuring Joseph that everythiny w us uncler urntrul 
It wasn't until actual proof of Davis' embezzlement of the trust funclo, that 
Joseph could emotionally accept that his attorney had embezzled the 
partnership money, and had buried him in a default Judgment for over 
$300,000.00 in monies which he, Joseph, had never received. ( R. 301,462-
63) 
The record indicates that Attorney Davis and Mr. Joseph were both 
served on May 5, 1980. (r. 14-17) Attorney Davis had committed his 
embezzlement of the majority of the partnership funds in June, 1979, 
nearly one full year before the suit. ( R. 450-460) The day following the 
service of summons, Mr. Joseph called Attorney Davis and requested that 
Davis take whatever steps were necessary and proper to represent him. 
(R. 301,702-03) over the next several months Mr. Joseph spoke with 
Attorney Davis repeatedly and consistently about the status of the lawsuit 
and Attorney Davis told him not to wo=y and that everything was taken 
care of. ( R. 704,462,301) Mr. Joseph in fact did believe that Attorney 
Davis was defending him and representing his interests. Mr. Joseph, who 
is a trucker and who has little education or sophistication in legal matters, 
did not personally know what was necessary and proper to defend and 
represent him, but he fully believed that his attorney had done and was 
doing whatever was proper and most advantageous in protecting his 
interest. (R. 300,462) Davis did subsequently tell Mr. Joseph's wife 
that he had in fact filed an answer. ( R. 467-68) 
In fact, Attorney Davis had not filed an answer on behali of Mr. 
Joseph, nor made any other responsive pleading. Rather, Attorney Davis 
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had intentionally and deliberately allowed the entering of the default 
"i"tnst Mr. aoseph and himself as the first step in an elaborate scheme. 
1 11<= purpose of the scheme was to avoid litigation on the merits, thus 
pi eventing, or at least delaying, the discovery process which would lead to 
the revelation of his embezzlement. Secondly, by procedurally side-
stepping the merits and concentrating on motions and procedures 
tangential to the real issues, Attorney Davis hoped to "consume" enough 
time to hopefully structure a settlement with all parties, and in that 
manner avoid discovery of his embezzlement. Finally, in the event he was 
not successful in avoiding the discovery process long enough to effect a 
settlement, the fact that there was a judgment against him would render 
moot the question of what happened to the partnership funds in his trust 
account: i.e., the sole issue would be execution of the judgment. 
Attorney scheme was, to a frightening degree, successful. 
He fraudulently used his position as an officer of the Court and fiduciary 
to his client to manipulate and pervert the process of justice to l) 
effectively delay discovery of his own embezzlement for nearly two and 
one-half years, and, 2) to effectively manipulate the judicial process in 
such a way that the full weight of a default judgment in excess of $300,000 
rests on Mr. Joseph. Argument I below closely examines the record before 
the Court. such an examination clearly reveals Attorney Davis' scheme 
as outlined above, and how successful it has been. 
8. Settlement Agreement 
Gn May 4, 1982, one week prior to the time set for trial of Plaintiff-
Appellants' claims and Defendant-Responden1='s cross-claims against 
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Defendants Baum and ChatilJion, Inc., a pre-trial conference was held. 
In conformance with the order of the court. each rarty was present 
personally and represented by counsel of record. With the help nf tile_ 
court, negotiations for settlement began. These negoUations took the 
pattern of meetings among the attorneys, followed by conferences of the 
attorneys with their respective clients, followed by further negotiations 
among the attorneys, and so on. After two hours, a stipulated settlement 
was achieved which compromised and settled a great many of the issues of 
dispute among the parties. Once the settlement amongst the parties had 
been achieved, a final conference was held in the court's chambers. Each 
party was present, with counsel, in the court's chambers. At that time, 
the terms of the settlement were read to and approved by the court. As a 
result, the trial date scheduled for the following week was struck. None 
of these facts are disputed. (R. 528,529,522,523) Counsel for 
Defendant- Respondent Joseph, immediately began work on the preparation 
of the written documents evidencing the agreement reached. ( R. 531) 
After several consultations by telephone among the various counsel for the 
parties regarding the wording of the final documents, complete documents 
were forwarded to Joseph Rust and Charles Hanna, attorneys for Plaintiffs, 
Joseph Mascaro and Shelby Taylor, Duane Burnett, attorney for Defendants 
Curtis Baum and ChatilJion, Inc., and to Attorney John Davis. These 
included a Settlement Agreement, a Stipulation and Motion to Dismiss, and 
an Order. ( R. 532) 
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Within one or two days of mailing these documents to the above 
11a med respective counsel, telephone conversations were had with both 
11dne Burnett and Charles Hanna. Duane Burnett indicated that he 
the documents and that he and his clients were ready and willing 
to sign them as prepared. Mr. Charles Hanna, who along with Joseph Rust, 
were representing the Plaintiffs, indicated that the documents prepared 
were satisfactory with one exception: paragraph 2(b) of the Settlement 
Agreement provided that any excess in value represented by the lots 
transferred to Plaintiff, Shelby Taylor, which value was beyond $113,000, 
would pass to Defendant, Charley Joseph. Mr. Hanna argued that any 
excess should go to Plaintiff, Joseph Mascaro. ( R. 532) A compromise was 
attempted but not successfully concluded. Note, however, that this 
dispute was not discussed and reduced to agreement at the pre-trial 
conference. It was not considered. It is only tangentially related to the 
main issues which were compromised and settled at the pre-trial 
conference. 
In a letter dated June 3, 1982, (R. 555), attorney Joseph Rust, lead 
counsel for the Plaintiffs, acknowledged that the documents, as prepared 
and submitted for approval as to form, were reflective of the compromise 
and settlement successfully bargained for by the respective parties at the 
pre-trial conference. Subsequently, Defendant Curtis Baum, and his 
attorney, Mr. Burnett did supply financial information regarding lot sales 
in the Parkvale Subdivision. At about the same time, Defendant Baum, 
delivered to his attorney, Mr. Burnett, fully executed warranty deeds 
the transfer of the specified lots to the parties as agreed. 
Shortly thereafter, in a letter dated June 23, 1982, counsel for 
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Plaintiffs acknowledged the value of the subJect lots, in Parkvale 
Subdivision, as represented by Defendant Baum and Chatj_U1on, Inc (I< 
556) Nevertheless, Plaintiffs indicated in that same letter that they dlci 
not intend to honor the agreement reached through compromise anrl 
settlement. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
ATTORNEY JOHN S. DAVIS, IN HIS CAPACITY AS AN 
OFFICER OF THE COURT AND AS A FIDUCIARY, DELI-
BERATELY PERPETRATED FRAUD ON THE COURT WHICH 
JUSTIFIES RELIEF UNDER RULE 60(b)(7), U.R.C.P. 
A. The record and facts reveal a clear scheme of an officer of 
the court to intentionally defraud the court. 
That Davis did in fact embezzle nearly $100,000 from the 
Joseph/ Mascaro partnership is evident from the record before this Court. 
( R. 450-460) This embezzlement occurred between June, 1979 and 
October, 1979. ( R. 450-460) Charley Joseph and attorney Davis were 
served on May 5, 1980 so the embezzlement had already occurred some time 
before. Attorney only concern was to keep hidden his embez-
zlement, and his representation of Charley Joseph would serve his purpose 
nicely. If he could arrange it so that a default judgment could be entered 
against Charley Joseph and himself, there would never be a confrontation 
on the issues raised by s Complaint. Without a confrontation on 
the issues there would be no need for discovery to occur, as the only 
relevant issue left would be execution on the judgment. Further, even if 
some discovery was pursued, he would assert the position that what he had 
done with his trust account and the partnership funds therein was 
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That this iv as his motive in deliberately allowing the default to be entered 
!,,,111 Charley Joseph's knowledge is abundantly clear even from the 
',, ,J before the Court. In Attorney deposition of June 18, 1981, 
"hefl he was pressed about the status of his trust account, he refused to 
answer any questions about it. He refused to even reveal the name of the 
bank, on the basis that such an inquiry is irrelevant in that the issue had 
been reduced to judgment: 
Q. Which bank is that? 
A. I don't think I need to answer that one. 
Q. I think it is important, because, of course, it 
goes to records that would reflect any 
disbursements out of that account. 
A. How do you mean? 
Q. Well, in other words, to determine exactly the status 
of that account, it may become necessary to subpoena 
the bank records, as far as determining--
A. I don't know that it is necessary at this point. 
You have got your Judgment. 
(Davis Deposition, June 18, 1981, at p. 59) 
Even more indicative of Attorney Davis' deliberate scheme to bring 
about the default against Charley Joseph and himself in an attempt to 
render moot any inquiry into the issues raised by Complaint is 
the following from the deposition of Charley Joseph, September 23, 1981. 
This deposition occurred following the gaining access to 
Attorney trust account records pursuant to Court Order. Charley 
.ioseph was being deposed when Attorney Davis arrived late, realized that 
ius trust account records had been discovered and were being examined by 
Charley Joseph; Attorney Davis objected: 
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Mr. Davis: I want to raise one other uLJ<=c,t1on, 
How does this relate to the issues at hand thdt 
have not already been reduced to judgment? 
Mr. Rust: Well, we have some questions as fdr 
as the involvement of Mr. Baum with Chatillion, 
Mr. Davis: 
account? 
In the disbursements of my trust 
************* 
Mr. Rust: Dale Potter, that he is preparing a motion 
to set aside our previous judgment against Mr. Joseph 
and so it would have relevance to any such motion that 
is contemplated in that area as well. so we think 
that the area is proper. 
Mr. Davis: Wait a minute though, the setting aside 
is a procedural matter. You don't argue the 
substance of the case on a sett{ng aside. If you 
want to set aside the judgment, then you've got a 
whole different story. But right now you have 
represented to the Court that there was an express 
determination why you should take judgement 
immediately and you got that. And all of your 
claims which have been raised in your Complaint 
have been reduced to judgment and until the 
default is recovered, this is not relevant to 
the issues at hand. (Deposition of Charley 
Joseph, September 23, 1981 at 13 and 14, R. 657-58) 
It is quite clear from the foregoing that Attorney Davis desperately 
wanted the issues raised in the Complaint reduced to judgment so that the 
status of his trust account would not come under the glaring light of 
judicial examination. In that way he hoped to avoid discovery altogether 
of his embezzlement. 
The above is graphic evidence of Attorney Davis' motive for 
intentionally allowing the default to be entered. Further evidence of the 
fact that he intentionally allowed it to be entered, and that it was not 
accident, comes from the fact that Charley Joseph repeatedly contacted 
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Attorney Davis about his failing to answer on his behalf. Charley 
c•seph's deposition of September 23, 1981, indicates Joseph was quite 
,cJcJ111ant that he wanted Attorney Davis to get the answer filed right away: 
Q. Charley, you earlier indicated that you recall 
being served with a Summons and a Complaint in 
this matter, is that correct? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Would you indicate again what you did upon receiving 
that Summons and Complaint? 
A. I get ahold of John the first evening. 
The next evening I called him and said, "Hey, 
I got a Summons here, did you get one?" And 
he said, "No, I haven't got mine yet." I said 
"Well, I got one tod;y." And he said, "I'll 
probably be get ting mine tonight or tomo-rrow." 
I said, "Okay." So the following day I called 
him and he said he got his. I said, "Do you 
want to do mine when you do yours or shall I 
get somebody else?" I said "Now, if you_'re 
not going to do it, you say so." He said, 
"No, I'll do it." My wife was sitting right 
there.-
(Depo. of Joseph,, Sept. 23, 1981, pp.58,59, R. 702-03) 
Joseph then asked him several times over the next few days about the 
status of the Answer. In response to these several inquires, Attorney 
Davis led him to believe that he was working on the Answer and that it 
would be filed on time. Attorney Davis was well aware of the need to file 
the Answer. He was reminded of it several times. 
Q. Did you ask him to go ahead and send it in on your 
behalf? 
A. I said, "You go ahead and answer mine." 
Q. What did Mr. Davis reply? 
A. He said, "I'll get it." Then he took it to Provo 
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with him. 
Q. Did you ever inquire of him if he had filed that 
answer? 
A. Many a time. I called h1rn and sa1d, "How are 1 ou 
corning on that response? Are you going to get it 
in?" and he said, 11 Yes 11 • 
Q. Were these inquire made before the due date of the 
Answer? 
A. Oh, yes. In fact, it was about seven or eight 
days before that I called his attention to it 
four or five times just in a couple or three 
days there. 
Q. What was his response? 
A. "We'll get it. I_'rn working on it and I_'ll get 
it.-" So I just assumed it was all done and 
mailed in to the court or wherever it goes. 
(Joseph Depa., Sept. 23, 1981 pp.60,61, R.704-05) 
Knowing full well that he was not going to answer the Complaint and put at 
issue his trust account, he nevertheless led Charley Joseph to believe that 
the Answer would be filed and Joseph relied on him. Subsequently, 
Attorney Davis told CharleyJosepl:'s wife that the Answer had been filed. 
(R. 467-68) The failure to file the Answer was intentional and not 
accidental. 
Rule 60(b)(l) allows a judgment to be set aside for "mistake, 
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect" if such motion is filed within 
three months of the entry of judgment. As defaults are not favored, 
Courts are generally favorably disposed to setting aside a default upon 
such a motion timely made. Attorney Davis was well aware that the 
default judgment had been taken. (Affidavit of Bert waunacott R 64) 
Yet he made no effort to have the default set aside within the time limits 
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0£ Rule 60(b)(l). In view of his strong motive to avoid a trial on the 
''' ·''• which would necessarily litigate the status of his trust account, 
'"ily reasonable explanation for his failure to make a motion under Rule 
t•'J( b) ( 1) is that he intentionally failed to do so. Only an officer of the 
court and a fiduciary having the trust of his client could be in a position to 
perpetrate such a fraud. 
The second part of Attorney Davis' plan to use the judicial process to 
cover-up his embezzlement was that he would use his knowledge of legal 
procedure to "consume" as much time as possible by procedurally side-
stepping the real issue. A look at the record will suffice to indicate how 
successful he was at this. The record before the Court is replete with 
procedural foot work, but there has never once been a hearing dealing with 
the merits of the case. Temporary Restraining Orders, Preliminary 
Injunctions, Motions to Stay, even a Motion to Alter or Amend a Written 
Order. Attorney Davis was attentive only when dealing with the side 
issues. In Charley JosepJ:'s Deposition of September 23, 1981, Davis 
reveals his intention in this regard. As pointed out above, he (Davis) 
arrived late and found out to his surprise that all of his trust account 
records had been discovered and were being examined. He made several 
objections to the examination of these records based on the fact that a 
judgment had been entered and that the records were now irrelevant. 
Attorney Rust met some of these objections by asserting that Attorney 
Potter was preparing a motion to have the judgment set aside. Attorney 
Davis then asserted the position that on procedural matters one does not 
get to the substance of the case. In so arguing, Attorney Davis gives us a 
clear view of his scheme: 
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Mr. Davis: Wait a minute though. The settltllJ aside 
is a procedural matter. You don't argue the 
of the case on a setting aside. If you want tu set .1,,1c1" 
the Judgments, then we've got a whole d1ffer<ent st"ry. 
But right now you have represented to the court that 
there was an expressed determination why yc>u should 
take judgment immediately and you got that. And all 
of your claims which have been raised in your complaint 
have been reduced to Judgment and until that default 
is removed, this is not relevant to the issues at hand. 
(Joseph depo., Sept. 23, 1981, p.14, R.658) 
Attorney Davis was delaying as long as possible any inquiry into the merits 
by diverting energy toward procedural matters that would not 
examine the merits. It is amazing that he was so successful for so long -
it took nearly one and one-half years following the filing of the lawsuit to 
discover his trust account records. Attorney Davis was doing two things: 
burying his client so the default could never be set aside, and at the same 
time occupying s energy with matters that would delay the 
discovery of his trust account. 
Knowing now as we do that Attorney Davis in fact did embezzle 
nearly $100,000 from the Mascaro/Joseph partnership, the peculiar 
procedural posture of this case becomes easy to understand. Attorney 
Davis embarked on a scheme to intentionally manipulate the judicial 
machinery to keep the issues raised in the Complaint from being 
litigated. As part of his scheme, he intentionally allowed a default 
judgment to be entered against himself and his client. He continued the 
perpetration of his scheme by energetically engaging in procedural efforts 
both to gain time to structure a settlement and to prevent his client from 
having the default set aside. Attorney Davis' fraud is fraud on the court, 
by an officer of the court. It is a most insidious violation of trust as an 
-Page 16-
officer of the court, and is fraud which defiles the court itself. 
c,cheme by an officer of the Court to defraud the Court 
1s ''fraud upon the Court" which justifies relief under 
Rule 60(b)(7) U.R.C.P. 
Rule 60(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure governs motions for 
setting aside and vacating final judgments and orders. The Utah Rule is 
based on and patterned after Rule 60 (b) Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 
[loth the Federal and Utah Rule 60(b) provide that: 
On motion and upon such terms as are just 
the court may in furtherance of Justice 
relieve a party or his legal representative 
from a final judgment, order, or proceeding 
for ... (emphasis added) 
The Utah Rule 60(b) continues on to list several, specific, enumerated 
grounds for such a motion including subpart (7) (Utah 60(b) (7) corresponds 
to Federal 60(b)(6)) which provides as grounds: " ... or (7) any other 
reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment." This 
inherent power to set aside a judgment for any "reason justifying relief" 
included in both the Utah and Federal Rule 60(b), is not limited in any way 
by any other provision or time constraint contained in the rule. This 
inherent power was emphasized in a note by the Federal Rules Advisory 
Committee on Civil Rules: 
And the rule expressly does not limit the court, 
when fraud has been perpetrated upon it, to 
give relief under the saving clause. As an 
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illustration of this situation, see Hazel-Atlas 
Glass Co. v. Hartford Empire Co., (194·l)---_i22 
U.S. 238. (Committee Note 1946, cited in b 
Moores Section 60.33, n.15). 
U.S. 238, 64 S.Ct. 997, 88 L.Ed 12SO (1944), referred to ill the above 
Advisory Committee Note, is the leading U .s. Supreme Court case dealing 
with the fraud contemplated in the "saving clause" of Federal Rule 
60(b) (6). [Utah Rule 60(b) (7) ]. In Hazel-Atlas, Hartford Empire Co. 
made application for a patent on a certain glass making process. The 
patent office let it be known that they were going to deny the patent. 
One of the attorneys for Hartford then wrote an article describing the 
product in glowing terms and lauding its public benefit. Hartford's 
attorneys persuaded a well-known labor leader in the industry to represent 
that he had written it; it was then published in a leading industry 
publication under the labor leadei;:' s name. The patent was issued based in 
part on the fraudulent article. Later Hartford brought an action for 
patent infringement against Hazel-Atlas Glass Company. The trial court 
dismissed suit and Hartford appealed. Hartford then used the 
same fraudulent article to persuade the appellate court to reverse and 
order judgment for Hartford, and, relying on the article, it did so. In 
1942, some 9 years after judgment had been entered against Hazel-Atlas, 
it made a !!:otion in the original appellate court to have the judgment set 
aside. The appellate court felt it did not have the authority because or 
the time lapse and the expiration of the term in which the Judgment was 
entered. 
on appeal to the u .s. Supreme Court, the judgment against Hazel-
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Atlas Company was set aside and the trial court was directed to re-enter 
· •, order of dismissal against Hartford. In so doing, the court 
11s1dered the great need of finality of judgments and the necessity of 
pulting an end to litigation. It also considered the time lapse of some 9 
years between the Judgment and the mot.ion to have it set aside. 
Nevertheless, in spite of all of the persuasive arguments militating against 
setting aside the judgment, the Court declared that some frauds on the 
court are "sufficiently gross" that the Court must take action to correct 
the injustice. The Supreme Court pointed out that this is an equitable 
power of ancient origin that the Courts exercise cautiously, "But where 
the occasion has demanded, where enforcement of the judgment is 
manifestly unconscionable, they have wielded the power without hesita-
tion." 322 U .s. at 244, 45 (emphasis added). The Court also pointed out 
that in a case where it would be "manifestly unconscionable" to allow the 
enforcement of a judgment, the relief granted may take several different 
forms. But the Court emphasized that: 
" ... whatever form the relief has taken in particular 
cases, the net result in every case has been the 
same: where the situation has required the Court 
has in some manner, devitalized the judgment even 
though the term at which it was entered had long 
passed away. 322 U.S. at 245 (emphasis added). 
It is quite clear from the holding in the Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. case 
that when a particularly "gross injustice" has occurred, or when the 
enforcement of a judgment would be manifestly unconscionable, Courts 
have the power to taKe whatever action is necessary to eliminate the 
rnJustice. In Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. the Supreme Court not only set aside 
the nine-year-old judgment, it ordered the trial court to enter a dismissal 
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against Hartford. 
Having determined that Courts have the power to sel aside a 
judgment or otherwise "devitalize" it, even in the face of the stronq ['nLfr, 
in favor of the finality of judgments, and even after a lapse of su111e g 
years, the question remains, when should this extraordinary equitable 
power be evoked; In Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. the Court exercised this 
equitable power to reverse the effects of a deliberate scheme to 
perpetrate a fraud on the Court itself by an attorney for one of the 
litigants. The very institution set up to administer justice was duped by 
an officer of the Court in a deliberate scheme, and as a result, the organ 
for the administration of justice was defrauded into working an injustice. 
The integrity of the judicial system itself was impeached. In speaking to 
this, the court said: 
Furthermore, tampering with the administration of 
justice in the manner indisputably shown here 
involves far more than in injury to a single 
litigant. It is a wrong against the institutions 
set up to protect and safeguard the public, 
institutions in which fraud cannot complacently be 
tolerated consistently with the good order of society. 
Hazel-Atlas Glass, supra at 246. 
The present case is controlled by the principles of Hazel-Atlas 
Glass indeed the facts of the present case are even more aggravated. 
Attorney Davis, as an officer of the Court, undertook to represent 
Defendant Joseph. But instead of representing Charley Joseph, he 
intentionally embarked on a deliberate scheme to manipulate the judicial 
process to cover up his embezzlement and to insulate himself from the 
consequences thereof, while at the same time, causing the power of the 
judicial machinery to press its full weight against his client. In 
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retrospect, and now knowing that Attorney Davis had, in fact, embezzled 
rhe partnership funds a year before the commencement of this lawsuit, his 
, 11\,erate scheme to pervert the judicial system for his own purpose is 
.1u1t.e clear. He intentionally allowed the default judgment to be entered 
against Charley Joseph and himself and then embarked on a series of 
procedural maneuvers designed to avoid and delay a confrontation on the 
merits, at the same time attempting to exhaust all post judgment remedies 
normally available to a litigant, thus insuring that the default judgment 
against Charley Joseph would not be set aside. 
The case of McKinney v. Boyle (9th Cir., 1968) 404 F. 2d 632, 
presents another factual situation quite similar to the present case. In 
McKinney, the Plaintiff's own attorney conspired with Plaintiff's 
estranged wife to settle, without his permission, his claims for personal 
injuries. He was out of the country when the settlement was made. He 
received nothing from the settlement. Upon returning to this country, some 
five years after the settlement was entered, he learned of the settlement. 
He moved under 60(b) to have the settlement set aside based on fraud and 
deceit by his own attorney. The District Court denied the motion, but on 
appeal, the denial was reversed. The appellate court in so ruling, pointed 
out this type of fraud was different than the type contemplated in Federal 
Rule 60(b) (3) which has a time limit. In differentiating between 60(b) (3) 
and 60(b)(6) [Utah 60(b)(7)] the Court said: 
But the main charge made by Plaintiff is 
fraud on the part of his own counsel and 
his former wife. This, we think brings 
him within ground (6), as to which there 
is no fixed time limit. McKinney, supra, 
at 624 (emphasis added). 
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What the Court in .1'.!E_Kinney found so repugnant was the fiict, as here, that 
a litigan1:'s owr. attorney had manipulated the Judicial system to defrc,u<J 
his own client. Not only was an officer of the court 111volved rn the fraud 
itsel£, but as in the present case, it was the part:(s own attorney who 
perpetrated the fraud to compromise his client's rights. The Court 
emphasized that the tampering with the judicial process, by an attorney, to 
undermine own clien1:'s interests clearly amount to fraud on the 
Court. The Court did not need to engage in any semantic or legal 
gymnastics to grant relief to the petitioner. 
We need not perform a semantic tour-de-force 
to achieve the result we reach, as Judge 
Learned Hand did in United States v. Karachalis, 
(2 Cir., 1953) 205 F. 2d 331, 335. That case 
did not involve a charge of fraud directed at a 
own counsel or his wife; this one does. 
In the case of Lockwood v. Boyles, (o.o.c., 1969) 46 FRD 625, the 
Court was asked to set aside a 14-year-old judgment based on allegations 
of perjury committed by a witness. In denying the motion, the Court 
enunciated the rule it felt was controlling in motions based on 60(b) [Utah 
60(b)(7)- "any other relief"] "fraud on the court". They stated the rule 
as follows: 
"Fraud upon the court" should, we believe 
embrace only that species of fraud which 
does, or attempts to, defile the court 
itself, or is a fraud perpetrated by 
officers of the court so that the judicial 
machinery can not perform in the usual 
manner its impartial task of adjudging 
cases that are presently for adjudication. 
Fraud inter partes, without more, should 
not be fraud upon the court, but redress 
should be left to a motion under 60(b) (3) 
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or to the independent action. 46 ¥.R.D. 
at 631 (emphasis added). 
,,, f1!1e the G.S. Supreme Court in Hazel-Atlas, supra, did not so restrict 
hU(liJ(6) [Utah Rule 60(b)(7)] motions for "fraud on the court", the 
present case easily fits into this more restrictive definition presented in 
Lock::-:'ood. Attorney Davis' scheme of pretending to represent defendant 
Joseph so he could cover-up his own embezzlement, is unquestionably fraud 
by an officer of the Court which "does attempt to defile the Court 
itself ... so that the judicial machinery cannot perform in the usual manner 
its impartial task ..• " Lockwood, supra, at 631. 
In Mallonee v. Grow, Alaska, 502 P. 2d 432 (1972), the court granted 
relief to a party moving to have a five-year-old judgment set aside on 
motion pursuant to 60(b)(6) [Utah 60(b)(7)] for fraud on the court. The 
fraud in Mallonee was not nearly so gross nor extensive as that in the 
!!azel-Atlas case, supra, or McKinney, supra. But in Mallonee, the Court 
found it significant that an attorney was involved in the fraud. The 
Mallonee court distinguished Lockwood v. Boyles on the grounds that in 
Lock::-:'ood, no attorney was involved in the fraud on the court: 
Lockwood involved an attempt to set aside a 
14-year-old judgment based on allegations of 
perjury conunitted by a witness. The Court 
pointed out that there was no "involvement 
of an attorney, (an officer of the court)." 
Accordingly, the most that was claimed was 
the fraud of an adverse party. 
Mallonee was represented by counsel who 
participated in filing pleadings which grossly 
overstated the amount due, in levying on 
property not owned by the judgment debtor 
and in failing to serve notice of the motion 
to confirm sale. An attorney is an officer 
of the court. Mallonnee, supra, at 438. 
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The Court went on to quote from 7 Moores Federal Practice, 60'33 at 
613, defining types of conduct by an attorney, as an officer, which amount.< 
to fraud on the Court: 
While he should represent his client with 
singular loyalty that loyalty obviously 
does not demand that he act dishonestly 
or fraudulently: on the contrary his loyalty 
to the Court, as an officer thereof, demands 
integrity and honest dealing with the court. 
And when he departs from that standard in 
the conduct of a case he perpetrates a 
fraud upon the Court. Mallonee, supra, 
at 438. 
Finally, the Alaska Court defined the type of conduct referred to by the 
Court in Lockwood v. Boyles, supra, in which an officer of the Court 
perpetrates fraud so that "the judicial machinery can not perform in the 
usual manner its impartial task of adjudging": 
Such fraud includes behavior which defiles 
the Court itself and which results in the 
inability of the judicial machinery to perform 
in the usual manner its impartial task of 
adjudicating cases. The adjudicative 
integrity of a Court may be defiled by the 
behavior of parties or attorneys which 
results in depriving adverse parties of 
substantive rights. mallonne, supra, at 438. 
Certainly Attorney conduct in purposely manipulating th< 
judicial machinery to prevent his client from asserting his meritoriow 
defenses and counterclaims (which defenses would have quickly expose< 
Attorney embezzlement of partnership funds) deprived defendan· 
Joseph of substantive rights. Such conduct was manifestly repugnant tc 
the standards of "integrity" and "honest dealing with the Court" require< 
of an attorney as an officer of the court. 
-Page 24-
Sutter v. Easterly, Mo., 189 s. W. 2d 284 (1945) presents another 
·rise where an attorney, as an officer of the Court, conspired to defraud 
'" Court. In Sutter, the attorney knowingly produced fabricated 
-v1dence in order to obtain a judgment. The court, in setting aside the 
Juclg m ent, said: 
"Peters' scheme and conspiracy were such a 
violation of a lawyer's duty to the court-
a duty imposed not alone by principles of 
honesty and good morals but also by a code 
of ethics adopted as rules of court, as to 
amount to a fraud on the court for which 
equity will grant relief." Sutter, supra, 
at 289. 
The Sutter court relied heavily on the Hazel-Atlas decision, supra, and 
after quoting extensively from Hazel-Atlas stated: 
"While the facts in the Hazel-Atlas case shows 
more extensive fraud, and one in which the 
client participated, the decision is authority 
for the principle that where a lawyer engages 
in a conspiracy to commit a fraud upon the 
Court by the production of fabricated evidence 
and by such means obtains a judgment then the 
enforcement of the judgment becomes "manifest!¥ 
unconscionable" and a court equity may devitalize 
the judgment. Sutter, supra, at 289. 
This Court is presented with a very ugly and distressing set of 
circumstances. Attorney Davis, as a fiduciary to his client, occupied a 
position of trust which he violated. Attorney Davis was also an officer of 
the Court and held a position of trust with the Court. He purposely 
violated both of these trusts. He did so to cover-up his own fraud and 
embezzlement of his client's funds from his attorney's trust account. In 
so doing, Attorney Davis intentionally engaged in a scheme to tamper with 
•he process of justice with the purpose of denying his client the 
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substantive right of a fair hearing on the merits of his case. The Judicial 
machinery in this case has been prevented, by fraud, from admmGLenn,-1 
justice in the usual way. The judgment by default entered herein shout" 
not be allowed to stand. By virtue of the decision. dnd tlie 
law set forth in the cases cited above, the court below clearly had the 
authority pursuant to Rule 60(b) (7) to set aside the default judgment that 
has been entered, therefore acted properly in modifying and setting aside 
so much of said judgment as was necessary to devitalize that part of said 
judgment that was unconscionable. 
c. Attorney Davis' fraud prevented Charley Joseph from having 
the opportunity to litigate his case on the merits, and was 
therefore extrinsic fraud and justified relief under Rule 
60 (b) ( 7). 
The case of Hazel-Atlas Glass supra, and the other cases 
examined above, all dealt with fraud perpetrated by an officer of the Court 
pursuant to a scheme to defraud. None of the cases considered it 
necessary to deal with the notions of extrinsic versus intrinsic fraud; the 
above Courts apparently felt no need to wrestle with the traditional 
distinction. The fact that the judicial system itsel£ had been defiled by 
officers of the Court in such a way as to preclude the proper and normal 
administration of justice was enough in and of itsel£ to justify granting 
relief under 60 (b) ( 7) for "any other reason justifying relief" without 
submitting to the mental and legal gymnastics attendant to making a 
distinction between extrinsic and intrinsic fraud. Indeed many jurisdic-
tions no longer follow the old extrinsic/ir,trinsic dichotomy and instead 
consider the seriousness of the fraud, the harshness of the result, and 
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intervening equities, i£ any. Nevertheless, even under the old notions of 
, 'lrrnsic versus inuinsic fraud, the default judgment entered herein 
,.[<J t,e set aside as the fraud involved was extrinsic. 
Extrinsic fraud is defined in 7 Moores Federal Practice section 
60.31[1] at 613 as follows: 
"Fraud is extrinsic where a party is prevented 
by trick, artifice or other fraudulent conduct 
from fairly presenting his claim or defenses 
or introducing relevant or material evidence. 
Moores, supra, citing United States v. 
Throckmorton, 98 U.S. 61 (1878) and others. 
The present case falls squarely within the above definition. Defendant 
Charley Joseph was prevented from "fairly presenting his defenses" by 
Attorney Davis' fraudulent conduct as set out above. In spite of 
Defendant Joseph's adamant exhortations and frequent reminders to file an 
appropriate answer, Attorney Davis did not. He intentionally did not do 
so. He purposely worked to his own client's defeat in order to protect 
himself. 
The leading case on extrinsic fraud is United States v. Throck-
!!'Orton, 98 U.S. 61 (1878). In Throck_!!!orton, the Court emphasized that 
there needs to be an end to litigation; and when an issue has been fairly 
and openly litigated in Court, then a judgment on that issue should remain 
final even if based on perjured testimony or a fraudulent document. 
l Note that without specifically reversing Throck_!!!orton, the United States 
Supreme court has, to a significant degree, abandoned this rule (see 
Marshall v. Holmes, 141 U.S. 589 (1891); Hazel-Atlas Glass Company v. 
Hartford Empire Co., supra, and cases cited above in this Memorandum). 
JUnetheless, the rule set forth in Throck_!!! orton clearly mandates the 
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judgment be set aside if there was in fact no real adversary trial 01 
decision as a result of an attorney's fraudulent conduct: 
Where the unsuccessful party has been prevented 
from exhibiting fully his case, by fraud or 
deception practiced on him by his opponent, 
as by keeping him away from court, a false 
promise of a compromise; or ... where an 
attorney fraudulently or without authority 
assumes to represent a party and connives at 
his defeat; or where the attorney regularly 
employed corruptly sells out his client's 
interest to the other side, - these and 
similar cases which show that there has 
never been a real contest in the trial or 
hearing of the case, are reasons for which 
a new suit may be sustained to set aside and 
annul the former judgment or decree, and 
open the case for a new and fair hearing. 
61 U.S. at 65, 66 (emphasis added). 
While the facts in Throckmorton did not involve an attorney intentionally 
striving for his own client's demise, the Court was quite clear that such a 
case would mandate the setting aside of the judgment and allowing a new 
trial. In United States v. Aakenvik ( D. Ore., 1910) 180 F. 137, the 
Court relied on the Throckmorton rule to set aside a judgment where an 
attorney did connive to lose. The case before this court is exactly that 
contemplated by the u.s. Supreme Court in Throckmorton. -------- Charley 
Joseph's regularly employed counsel connived at his defeat and 
intentionally and maliciously prevented Mr. Joseph from having a fair 
opportunity to present his defense. 
In Rice v. Rice, 117 Utah 27, 212 P. 2d 685 (1949) our own Supreme 
Court relied on the Throckmorton rule, to amend a decree of distribution of 
probate. The facts in Rice, while not as egregious as the present case, 
are similar. In Rice the executrix, for her own gain, mislead the Court 
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with regard to the proper distribution of assets under the will in question. 
, 111' ':ourt held that the executrix had a duty to the beneficiaries under the 
,.,u and also a duty to the Court as an officer of the court similar to that 
,,f an attorney. The executrix had defrauded the Court, and that fraud 
was extrinsic in that the executrix's actions prevented a fair and full 
hearing on the issues. 
More recently in Haner v. Haner, 13 Utah 2d 299, 373 P.2d 577 
( 196 2) our State Supreme Court upheld its holding in Rice. Moreover, in 
Haner the Court indicated that it would not be bound by the traditional 
notions of extrinsic and intrinsic fraud. The Court said: 
"It seems more realistic to say that when it 
appears that the processes of justice have 
been so completely thwarted or distorted as 
to persuade the Court that in fairness and 
good conscience the judgment should not be 
permitted to stand, relief should be granted. 
Haner, supra, at 578. 
And, in a very recent case, St. Pierre v. Edmonds, Utah, 656 P.2d 
1009 (1982) this Court held that it would no longer be bound by the old 
notions of intrinsic and extrinsic fraud. Instead it would consider the 
seriousness of the fraud and the harshness of the result to determine 
whether relief was justified. Thus the Utah Court has now clearly and 
unequivocally declared its intention to follow the rule laid down in 
Marshall v. Holmes, 141 U.S. 589 (1891) and Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. 
Hartford Empire co., supra. The real question is whether the fraud is of 
such a nature that it is "against conscience to execute a judgment." St. 
v. Edmonds, supra. 
The present case is clearly one in which the very "processes of 
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justice have been so completely thwarted or distorted" by Attorney Davis, 
that the judgment in "fairness and good conscience" should n<>t 1 ,_ 
permitted to stand. Haner, supra. Even under the old rule laid dnwn 'I• 
supra, and adhered to in Rice v. Rice, supra, extrins1c 
fraud has been practiced in such a way as to deny defendant Charley Joseph 
the right to a full and fair hearing on the merits. A fortiori, under the 
more liberal view expressed in St. Pierre v. Edmonds, supra, and haneE....:::'..:_ 
!! an er, supra, which is consistent with the rule set forth in Marshall v. 
U.S. 589 (1891) and Hazel-Atlas Glass Company v. Hartford 
co., supra, (and other cases cited above) the default judgment in 
the present case, intentionally allowed to be entered by reason of the 
fraud practiced by Attorney Davis, and which prevented Defendant Joseph 
from litigating the issues raised in Plaintiff's Complaint, should be set 
aside. 
POINT II 
JUDGMENT IS FOR UNLIQUIDATED DAMAGES WHICH 
HAVE NOT BEEN PROVED AND WHICH ARE NOT 
SUPPORTED BY THE PLEADINGS; THE JUDGMENT 
IS MANIFESTLY UNJUST, IS VOIDABLE, AND 
SHOULD BE SET ASIDE. 
The law is well settled that unless damages are for a sum certain (as 
in a promissory note) or are capable of calculation by a simple 
mathematical process (as in computing interest) a default judgment admits 
a plaintiff's right to recover something but does not admit the amount he is 
entitled to recover. 34 C.J. Judgments Section 176, 359; 49 C.J.S. 
Judgments Section 201 (c) Section 216; Hurd v. Ford, 78 Utah 49, 276 
P.2d, 908 (1924); bayerle Sand and Gravel, Inc. v. Martinez, 118 Ariz. 
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1.11, 574 P.2d 853 (1978); Hallett Const. Co. v. Iowa Highway comm. 258 
''?0, 139 N.W. 2d 421 (1966); Becker v. Boothe, 184 Kan. 830, 339 
1• ,,f 292 (1959); United National Indemnity Co. v. Zullo, 143 Conn. 124, 
120 A.2d 73 (1956); Hatch v. Sugarhouse Finance Co., 20 Utah 2d 156, 
434 P.2d 758 (1967). 
With regard to the necessity of proving unliquidated damages 
pursuant to a default judgment, the rule, as expressed in 34 C.J. Judgments 
section 1 76, p. 389, is as follows: 
"Where the action is for an unliquidated 
claim or amount, a default admits plain-
tiff's right to recover something, but 
does not admit the amount to which he is 
entitled; this must be established by 
proof, on further proceedings to determine 
and assess the amount of the judgment, and 
there is no final judgment until the amount 
is ascertained. 
Where the cause of action is such that 
Plaintiff, if entitled to recover at all, 
is entitled to recover a fixed or liquid-
ated amount, or where the amount of his 
damages is ascertainable by pure calcula-
tion, defendant's default admits Plaintiff's 
right to recover the sum demanded in the 
declaration or complaint, and judgment may 
be entered therefore, without further proof, 
and without an assessment of damages," 
34 c.J. Judgments section 176 at 389. 
"Where the amount of plaintiff's claim or 
demand is unliquidated, defendant's default 
does not admit the amount which plaintiff 
is entitled to recover, and it is 
incumbent upon plaintiff to prove the 
amount. Under some statutes, where the 
amount of plaintiff's claim is ascertainable 
by mere calculation, as in an action on a 
note, plaintiff is entitled to judgment for 
the amount claimed, without any other evidence 
thereof. But the instrument sued on must be 
produced or proof of its contents be offered." 
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34 C.J. Judgments Section 410, at 190 (emphasis 
added) 
The rule is that only if the recovery by def a ult is a "fixed c, 1 
liquidated amount, or where the amount of his damages is ascertaina.ble 1 .. 
pure calculation, defendants default admits plaintiff's right to recoveL. 
34 C.J. section 176, Judgments p. 389. In all other instances, i.e., where 
damages are unliquidated there is no final judgment until the amount of 
damages are proved. 49 C.J.s. Judgments, Section 20l{c) thus explains: 
"Where the action is in tort or for an 
unliquidated claim or amount, a default 
admits Plaintiff's right to recover 
something, at least nominal damages, but 
does not admit the amount to which he is 
entitled, and there is no final judgment 
until the amount is ascertained, as 
discussed infra section 216. 
In Hallett Const. Co. v. Iowa State 258 Iowa 
520, 139 N. W. 2d 421 (1966) defaults were entered against the State 
Highway Commission upon four separate petitions. The petitions included 
a computation of damages which listed some seven to ten items of damages 
{depending on which set of the several petitions were considered) and a 
computation of a final figure based on the itemization. There was also a 
statement from an officer of Hallett that the final figure was a "sum 
certain 11 • The court held that the claims were not for a sum certain 
merely because it prayed for a specific amount for each alleged item of 
damage, and the amount thereof was largely a matter of opinion from which 
qualified persons might fairly and honestly differ. 
In the case of Ace Grain Co., Inc. v. American Eagle Fire In-
surance Co., {S.O.N.Y., 1951) 11 F.R.D. 364, the insurer of destroyeJ 
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cargo hired an independent surveyor to appraise the amount of the damage. 
The plaintiff contended that the appraisal by the surveyor was a sum 
, ; ,, u1, In rejecting this argument the Court said: 
"The surveyor's findings represent an opinion 
as to value and other factors which the defen-
dant is not required to accept or it is con-
cluded thereby even though it retained the 
surveyor. * * * The claimed cargo damage under 
an insurance policy, is unliquidated and is 
not converted into one for a liquidated amount 
or a "sum certain" by a surveyor's report 
intended for adjustment or trial purposes. 
The defendant has the right to a judicial 
determination of the extent of the damages 
claimed by plaintiff and the appropriate 
method for determining this issue is either 
by the Court or upon a reference in accordance 
with Rule 55(b) (2)" (emphasis added). 
Similarly, in Melville v. 108 Colo. 520, 120 P.2d 189 (1941). a 
case involving the dissolution of a trust, the Court found that before an 
amount of damages could be assessed in the default, an accounting wa 
absolutely necessary. Finally, in Beyerle Sand and Gravel, Inc. v. 
Martinez, 118 Ariz. 60, 574 P.2d 853 (1978). in an action for breach of 
lease regarding the replacement of topsoil, the Court held that the 
plaintiffs were not entitled, by virtue of the default judgment, to entry of 
judgment for the amount prayed for in their complaint. The Court said: 
"A claim is not for a "sum certain" merely 
because it is for a specific amount. Hallett 
construction Com an v. Iowa State Hi hwa 
conunission, 258 Iowa 520, 139 H.W.2d 421 1966). 
A contrary holding would permit almost any 
unliquidated claim to be transformed into a 
claim for a sum certain merely by placing a 
monetary amount on the item claimed damaged 
even though such amount has not been fixed, 
settled or agreed upon by the parties and 
regardless of the value of the claim. Nor is 
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the claim one which can by computation be 
made certain. Beyerle, supra, at 856. 
See also Johanson v. United Truck Lines, 62 Wash. 2d 437, 383 P.2d SU 
( 1963) (a default admits plaintiff's right to recover, but does not ad mn 
the amount claimed where damages are unliquidated, and amount of 
recovery in such cases must be established by proof) and Kelly 
Broadcasting co., Inc. v. sovereign Broadcasting, Inc., Nev., 606 P.2d 
1089 ( 1980) (where default judgment is neither for a sum certain, nor for a 
sum which can be made certain from computation, plaintiff must prove his 
damages). 
In the instant case there was never a hearing as to damages and no 
proof was ever been offered to sustain damages in any amount. As a 
result, the default judgment, as entered, contains numerous errors. There 
is an admitted error in the amount of damages awarded in that the total 
award is over-stated by $83,000, plus interest. (Tesch Affidavit, 
February 16, 1982). The largest part of the remaining amount of damage 
was for prospective partnership profits: in affect an account receivable. 
Such prospective partnership profits constituted an asset of the 
partnership, and the partners each had the right to one-half of such an 
asset, when and if the partnership could successfully collect it. But the 
collection of such an asset was prospective, and indeed doubtful at that. 
certainly one partner was not liable to the other for such prospective, 
uncollected profits. Thus, in addition to the mathematical error, the 
amount of the judgment is further overstated by $120,000. Further, the 
judgment as entered made no provision for partnership expenses which had 
been incurred and which amounted to several thousand dollars. 
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l\dditionally, of the monies received by the partnership, and deposited in 
he trust account of the partnership's attorney, approximately $100,000 
embezzled by John Davis. The record before this Court reveals that of 
·Ji"t $100,000, Charley Joseph did not receive any of it, nor was he 
benefitted in any way by it. (R. 450-60) It was embezzled from the 
partnership and each partner must sustain one-half of the loss, Thus, in 
addition to the $83,000 math error described above, the judgment was 
overstated by one-half the amount of money (approximately $100,000) 
embezzled by Attorney Davis. 
In view of the fact that no hearing was held to determine the proper 
amount of damages as is required, that the judgment is not supported by the 
pleadings, that there is an obvious and gross mathematical error in the 
amount awarded by the default judgment in the approximate amount of 
$83,000, that the amount of damages awarded for partnership profits is 
without basis at law or in equity, the judgment is void, is manifestly 
unjust, and should be set aside. 
POINT III 
THE PLEADINGS DO NOT SUPPORT THE JUDGMENT. 
An examination of Plaintiff's Complaint reveals that in the 
Plaintiff's first cause of action, each and every allegation contained 
therein is directed against Attorney Johns. Davis. (Plaintiff's only other 
cause of action in the complaint is directed solely toward defendants Baum 
and Chatillion), There is only one allegation that is directed against 
,;harley Joseph, and that is directed primarily at Attorney John Davis, and 
rn the alternative, toward Charley Joseph. That said allegation is 
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Paragraph 31; it reads as follows: 
"Upon information and belief, defendant Davis 
has commingled his client's funds with his own 
and he alone or he and defendant Joseph have 
diverted the plaintiff's funds to his or their 
own use. '1 
The above allegation deals only with the partnership funds received by the 
partnership and turned over to Attorney Davis to be placed in his trust 
account. It is not in dispute that the vast majority of the funds received 
by the partnership, and placed in the trust account, were embezzled by 
Attorney Davis for his own use. 
Other than Paragraph 31 of Plaintiff's Complaint, not a single 
allegation is made against Charley Joseph. Each and every other allegation 
is directed solely and entirely against Attorney John s. Davis. Thus, 
there are two legal issues raised. The first is a question of a default 
judgment that is not supported by the plaintiff's complaint. The second is 
with regard to the one allegation against defendant Charley Joseph that is 
made, i.e., the misuse of the partnership funds received by Attorney Davis 
and placed in his trust account. This brief will first address the issue of 
the failure of the default judgment to be supported by the pleadings. 
It is a fundamental rule that a default judgment, is limited to the 
allegations contained in the complaint. Thompson v. Wooster, 114 U.S. 
104 (1884); Nishimatsu Construction Co., Ltd. v. Houston National 
Bank, (5th Cir., 1975). 515 F.2d 1200; Intermountain Food Equipment co. 
Idaho, 383 P.2d 612; Southern Arizona School for Boys, Inc. 
v. Chery, 119 Ariz. App. 277, 580 P.2d 738 (1978). Furthermore, even 
though the prayer may ask for general relief, the judgment must rest on the 
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well pleaded facts of plainti£f's complaint. Intermountain Food Equip-
r1t Co. v. Waller, supra, Cobb v. Cobb, supra, Nishimatsu Const. Co., 
, I. ":..:...._!:! ouston National Bank, supra. 
In the case of Cobb v. Cobb, 233 P.2d 423 (Idaho, 1951), the Court 
stated the rule as follows: 
"A judgment for plaintiff by default must 
strictly conform to, and be supported by, 
the allegations of the petitioner complaint. 
Cobb, supra, at 424 (citing 49 C.J.S. Judgments, 
Section 214, p. 378)." 
And in a more recent case, the Filth Circuit Court of Appeals in 
Nishimatsu Const. co., Ltd. v. Houston National Bank, supra, vacated a 
default judgment for the following reason: 
"There must be a sufficient basis in the pleadings 
for the judgment entered. As the supreme Court 
stated in the "venerable but still definitive case" 
of Thompson v. Wooster: A default judgment may be 
lawfully entered only "according to what is proper 
to be decreed upon the statement of the bill, assumed 
to be true", and not "as of course according to the 
prayer of the bill", 114 u.s. at 113. The 
defendant is not held to admit facts that 
are not well pleaded or to admit conclusions 
of law. In short, despite occasional statements 
to the contrary, a default is not treated as an 
absolute confession by the defendant of his 
liability and of the plaintiff's right to 
recover. Nishimatsu, supra, at 1206 (emphasis 
in original)". 
The default judgment that is not supported by well pleaded factual 
allegations is thus void. In Price v. Sun Master, 27 Ariz. App. 771, 558 
P.2d 966 (1976). the Court said: 
"If a complaint fails to state facts legally 
entitling plaintiff to recovery, a default 
judgment rendered thereon is void." (citing 
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Walls v. Stewart Buildin and Roofing supplv, 
Inc., 23 Ariz. App. 123, 521 P.2d 167 1975 
*********** 
Even though two years have 
void judgment was entered, 
be set aside and vacated. 
supra, at 969. 
elapsed since the 
the judgment must 
Price v. Sun Master, 
The fact that the plaintiff could have pleaded legally sufficien1 
grounds in his complaint is not enough; the complaint must present a lega 
cause of action. This was the issue presented in Ness v. Greater 
Arizona Realty, Inc., 21 Ariz. App. 231, 517 P.2d 1278 (1974). In Ness 
the plaintiff alleged that a promissory note she signed was signed by her a 
an agent for and on behalf of the defendants. The defendant's names di 
not appear on the note. The Court stated that plaintiff could hav 
pleaded that defendants were liable to her on the underlying obligation fc 
which the note was given, but this she failed to do, and the Court set asid 
a default judgment entered in her favor. 
While plaintiffs Taylor and Mascaro may have alleged sufficier 
facts to support the default judgment as against Attorney Davis, they mac 
no factual allegations against defendant Charley Joseph except as t 
the trust account funds (see below). Therefore, the default judgment< 
to the defendant Charley Joseph is void and should have been vacated ar 
set aside. 
With regard to the one allegation made in plaintiff's complai 
against defendant Charley joseph, i.e., paragraph 31 of Plaintiff 
Complaint, the allegation is directed primarily against Attorney Davis a 1 
only in the alternative against defendant Charley Joseph. The allegati< 
refers primarily to funds that Attorney Davis deposited in his tru 
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account when acting as an attorney for the partnership. The record 
f•'re this Court clearly reveals that Attorney Davis embezzled the 
''""'- part of those funds (nearly $100,000 for his own use). 
POINT IV 
THE AGREEMENT REACHED THROUGH 
compromise AND SETTLEMENT SHOULD 
BE ENFORCED 
It is a basic rule that the law fa vars the settlement of disputes. Rio 
Algom Corporation v. Jirnco, LTD., Utah, 618 P.2d 497 (1980), Tracey 
Collins Bank and Trust Co. v. Travelstead, Utah, 592 P.2d 605 (1979), 
International Motor Rebuilding Co. v. United Motor Exchange, Inc., 
193 Kan. 497, 393 P.2d 992 (1964), Lomas & Nettleton co. v. Tiger 
Enterprise, Inc., 99 Idaho 539, 585 P.2d 949 (1978). as a result, if a 
dispute is compromised and settled, such a settlement is binding upon the 
parties thereto and may be enforced by either party. Tracy Collins 
Bank and Trust Co. v. Travelstead, Utah, 592 P.2d 605 (1979); Flott v. 
Mfg. Co., 189 Kan. 80, 367 P.2d 44 (1962); See also, 15A 
Am.Jur. 2d Compromise and Settlement Sections 7 & 25. 
In the recent case of Tracy Collins Bank and Trust Co. v. Tra-
velstead, Utah, 592 P.2d 605 (1979), the Utah supreme Court upheld the 
trial court's summary enforcement of a settlement agreement. In strictly 
enforcing the terms of the settlement agreement, the Court clearly 
enunciated the proper rule regarding the enforcement of an agreement 
reached through compromise and settlement: 
SettlemP.nts are favored in the law, 
and should be encouraged, because 
of the obvious benefits accruing 
not only to the parties, but also 
to the judicial system. An ex-
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peditious means of enforcing a 
settlement agreement is conducive 
to this policy of law in that it 
adds the presence of judicial final-
ity to the agreement, insuring that 
the goals of the parties as expressed 
in the agreement can be speedily 
attained. Travelstead, supra, 592 
P.2d at 607. 
The majority of the courts in our sister states also recognize such a 
rule of strictly and summarily enforcing agreements reached through 
compromise and settlement. In Lomas & Nettleton Co. v. Tiger Enter-
prise, Inc., 99 Idaho 359, 585 P.2d 949 (1978), the Idaho Supreme court 
stated the rule as follows: 
Because there is an obvious public 
policy favoring the amicable settle-
ment of litigation, ••• agreements 
accomplishing this will be disregarded 
only for the strangest of reasons. 
Furthermore, such reasons must be 
shown by clear and convincing evidence. 
Lomas, supra at 585 P.2d 952. 
Similarly in Connor v. Hammer, 201 Kan. 22, 439 P.2d 116 (1968) 
that court states: 
The law favors the compromise and 
settlement of disputes and when 
parties, in the absence of an 
element of fraud or bad faith, 
enter into an agreement settling 
and adjusting a dispute, neither 
party is permitted to repudiate 
it. Connor, supra, 439 P.2d at 
118 and 119. 
And in Greater Anchora e Area Borough v. Cit of Anchorage, 
Alaska, 504 P.2d 1027 1976 the court ruled: 
sound judicial policy dictates that 
private settlements and stipulations 
between the parties are to be favored 
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and should not be lightly set asi<le. 
Greater Anchorage, supra, 504 P.2d 
at 1031. 
And for a particularly thorough discussion of the law of compromise 
"'d settlement see the case of International Motors Rebuilding Co. v. 
United Motor Exchange, Inc., 193 Kan. 497, 393 P.2d 992 (1964). in which 
case the court emphasized that absent a strong showing of fraud or bad 
faith, neither party may be allowed to repudiate an agreement reached 
through compromise and settlement. See also Service Oil co. v. 
Coleman Oil Co., (1st Cir., 1972) 470 F.2d 925; Ranta v. Rake, 91 Idaho 
376, 421 P.2d 747 (1966); Gordon H. Ball, Inc. v. Oregon Erecting co., 
273 Or. 179, 539 P.2d 1054 (1975); Snyder v. Tompkins, Wash. App., 579 
P.2d 994 (1978); Feisner v. Stinnett, 212 Kan. 26, 509 P.2d 1156 (1975); 
15A Am. Jur. 2d Compromise and settlement Sections 5 and 25. 
In this woefully long and disturbing case presently before the Court, 
a settlement agreement was finally successfully negotiated and agreed to 
by all parties. The terms of the agreement were presented to and 
approved by the Honorable Judge sa waya in his chambers. All parties 
were present and represented by counsel. The terms of the agreement 
were reduced to written form and submitted to opposing counsel for 
approval of the form. As set forth above, approval was received from all 
parties as to the form with the exception of one small sub-paragraph which 
dealt with a tangential issue not discussed at the pre-trial settlement 
conference. 
There was one condition f.>recedent that remained unaccomplished: 
c·efendants Baum and Chatillion needed to provide financial information to 
support their valuation of the lots. Counsel for Plainti£fs Mascaro and 
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Taylor acknowledged such a valuation in a letter dated ,Jcme 21, J 982 ,,, 
described above. (R.556) The condit.ion precedent having ""''°''' satisficc 
the terms of the agreement being qwte clear, the lower court order eu 1 hri, 
the settlement agreement previously reached be enforced as set forth ui 
Defendant-Respondent's Motion to Enforce Settlement Agreement. (See 
Order and Judgment, dated November 5th, 198 2. R .5 79) In so doing, all of 
the issues of this protracted and unfortunate case were resolved except 
for those issues related to Plaintiff-Appellant Mascaro's claims against 
Defendant-Respondent. All of the claims and issues involv:L-ig Plaintiff-
Appellant Taylor were resolved upon terms he had agreed to. Plaintiff-
Appellant Mascaro received partial satisfaction of his claim against his 
former partner, Defendant- Respondent Joseph. 
POINT V 
A MOTION PURSUANT TO RULE 60(b) (7) MAY 
BE CONSTRUED AS AN INDEPENDENT ACTION. 
A Motion pursuant to Rule 60 ( b) ( 7) for fraud on the Court is based on 
ancient principles of equity and rests in the Court's inherent equitable 
powers. (see cases cited in Point I) As such, in cases where none of the 
parties would be prejudiced, many courts take the position that it makes no 
difference whether the motion pursuant to Rule 60(b) (7) is construed as a 
motion in the same case or as an independent action in equity. In 
Moores Federal Procedure, Section 60.38 [ 3] at 650 the rule is thus stated: 
Where the adverse party is not preJudiced 
an independent action for relief from a 
federal judgment may be treated as a 60(b) 
motion (citing Bros. Inc. v. W.E. Grace 
Manufacturing Co., (5th Cir., 1963), 32f 
.2d 594); and, conversely; a 60(b) motion 
may be treated as the institution of an 
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independent action. (citing Hadden v. 
Rumsey Products, (2nd Cir., 1952) 196 F.2d 
92; Nixon v. Brewer, (MD Ala., 1970) 49 
FRD 122. 
ln the case of Selway v. Burns, 420 P.2d 640, the Montana Supreme 
('r_,urt i11terpreted its rule 60(b) [which in pertinent part is identical to the 
federal Rule 60(b) as is Utah Rule 60(b)] in the same way. In a case that 
was bought by way of a 60(b) motion by a non-party, that court upheld such 
a procedure, and in so doing held: 
Appellant's contention that Mrs. Suthard's 
standing before the court depends upon Rule 
60(b) and the joinder requirements of Rule 
19 is too narrow. It is not necessary for 
purposes of this appeal to construe Rule 60(b) 
to determine standing, because it has long been 
the rule in Montana that a Court of equity 
has inherent power, independent of statute, 
to grant relief from judgments gained by fraud. 
Bullard v. Zimmerman, 88 Mont. 271, 292 p.730. 
The Bullard case, supra, has since been followed 
many times by this Court. Most recently, in 
Cure v. Southwick, 137 Mont. 1, 349 P.2d 575, 
this Court added that the relief may be granted 
either on motion in the original action or in a 
separate equity suit. Rule 60(b) expressly 
preserved this inherent power in its last 
sentence which provides: "This rule does not 
limit the power of a court to entertain an 
independent action to relieve a party from a 
judgment, order, or proceeding, or to grant 
relief to a defendant not personally notified 
as may be provided by law, or to set aside a 
judgment for fraud upon the court." 
our federal courts also recognize and use the 
historic equity power to set aside judgments 
gained by fraud. Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. 
Hartford Empire Co., 322 U.S. 238, 64 S.Ct. 
997, 88 r., Ed. 1250. The only limitation 
that has been placed upon the exercise of this 
power is that the investigating court must 
observe the usual safeguards of the adversary 
process by granting notice to affected persons 
and by conducting a fair hearing on the exist-
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ence of the fraud. Universal Oil Co. v. Root 
Refining Co., 328 u.s. 575, 66 s.ct. 1176, 9o 
L.Ed. 1447 (emphasis added). 
This Court has in the past adopted the position that where,, Jurlgmeri1 
is attacked for fraud on the court under the provisions of Rule ?,() ( b) ( i 1 
U.R.C.P., such a proceeding must be pursued in an independent action by 
filing a separate suit, paying the statutory filing fee and requiring the 
statutory issuance and service of process. Shaw v. Pilcher, 9 Utah 2d 
222, 341 P.2d 949 (1959). Respondent-Defendant suggests that the 
absolute requirement that the court may consider and resolve questions of 
fraud upon the court only if the form of the attack is an independent 
action is not supported by a majority of the recent decisions dealing with 
the problem, and is an elevation of form over substance. Based upon the 
U.S. Supreme Court's holding in Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford 
Empire Co., supra, and the cogent arguments in Selway v. Burns, supra, 
and Moores Federal Practice, supra, (and cases cited therein), Respon-
dent-Defendant urges this Court to adopt the better reasoned rule, that as 
long as the inherent safeguard of due process, including notice and 
jurisdiction and opportunity to respond, are clearly met, the distinction 
between a motion 60(b) for fraud on the court and an independent action 
for the same is without significance. 
It is not, however, necessary that that the Court adopt such a 
position in the present case. While Respondent attacked the Default 
Judgment in the original action by way of a motion pursuant to 60 (b) (7), 
U.R.C.P., in view of the Shaw v. Pilcher line cf cases, Respondent-
Defendant Joseph additionally attacked the Default Judgment Ul ar' 
independent action brought in equity. That case is was brought in Third 
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ll istrict Court, Salt Lake County, State of Utah, and is entitled Charley 
,J_oseph v. John s. Davis, et. al., Civil No. C-82- 3484. A filing fee was 
,,1<1 ,111d all named defendants, which includes all parties in the original 
,._, 1ur1, were properly served with process of the court. By order of the 
,-,,urt, dated November 5th, 1982, and signed by Judge Dee (R.587). the new 
and independent suit in equity (Civil No. C-80-3484) was consolidated with 
the original action (civil No. C-80-3305). Respondent- Defendant Joseph 
has thus complied with the requirements of this court as set forth in Shaw 
and subsequent cases. 
SUMMARY 
The default judgment entered herein against Defendant-Respondent 
Joseph, was entered as a result of attorney Davis' scheme to intentionally 
and maliciously prevent Defendant- Respondent Joseph from responding to 
the issues raised in the Plaintiff-Appellants' complaint. Further, as a 
result of his special knowledge as a lawyer, attorney Davis was able to 
manipulate the judicial process in an attempt to prevent any post judgment 
relief that may have been available to his client: he failed to make a 
timely motion to have the default set aside pursuant to Rule 60 (b) ( l) even 
though he was well aware of the default; he intentionally lost a motion to 
have the default set aside by failing to present a real argument in support 
of the motion and presented no real defense against a motion to have the 
default made final. In both instances he resented no written briefs nor 
1 id he make an earnest oral argument on these respective motions. 
'<ttorney Davis' motive in purposely working at his own client's defeat was 
•o 1;revent the discovery of his embezzlement of partnership funds from his 
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trust account by preventing litigation of the issues ra.ised l11 the Plal11tlff-
Appellants' complaint. Defendant- Respondent Joseph, was thus denied 
his right of access to the court to assert his defenses and countercla1rns 
As a further result of Attorney Davis' fraud, a default Judqment Wds 
entered and made final even though it was unsupported by the pleadings, 
and was clearly erroneous on its face. Said default judgment consisted of 
a money judgment in excess of $300,000.00, for unliquidated damages which 
had never been proved, and which contained an obvious mathematical error 
on its face. 
Such a default judgment, obtained as the result of a massive fraud on 
the court by an officer of the court, and which was defective on its face, 
and was unsupported by the pleadings, was properly subject to being set 
aside in its entirety by the court below, either by way of motion in the 
original action or pursuant to an independent suit in equity. Defendant-
Respondent Joseph brought a motion pursuant to Rule 60(b) (7), U.R.C.P., 
in the original action, and in addition, brought an independent suit in 
equity attacking the default judgment as having been obtained through 
fraud on the court pursuant to a scheme by an officer of the court to 
defraud and pervert the judicial process. The two actions were 
consolidated. 
Prior to the lower court ruling on the two consolidated attacks on the 
default judgment, a settlement agreement was reached among the parties 
to this appeal which discharged all of Defendant-Respondent Joseph's 
liability to Plainti£f-Appellant Taylor, and satisfied the first $60,000.00 
of any liability which might ultimately be enforced against Defendant-
Respondent Joseph and in favor of Plaintiff-Appellant Mascaro. 
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Plaintiff-Appellants attempted to repudiate the settlement agreement, but 
rhe lower court found that a settlement had in fact been reached, and 
,, l <'r ced the same. Subsequent to the enforcement of the settlement 
,q,,eement, the lower court held a hearing on Defendant-Respondent 
Juseph's motion, pursuant to Rule 60(b) (7), as consolidated with 
Defendant-Respondent Joseph's independent suit in equity, to set aside 
the default judgment based on fraud on the court. The court found that 
the default judgment had been obtained as a direct result of attorney 
Davis' scheme to defraud the court. However, rather than set aside the 
entire default judgment, the court set aside so much of the judgment as had 
not already been satisfied by the settlement agreement. The court's 
action in so doing was proper, and is supported by the facts of this case, 
both as regards Attorney Davis' embezzlement and subsequent clear 
scheme to defraud the court, and the settlement agreement which was 
reached. The applicable law also clearly supports the court's action. 
The court's order of February 8, 1983, modifying in part and setting aside 
in part the previously entered default judgment, should be upheld in its 
entirety. However, in the event this Court determines that the lower 
court's order is in some manner unsupportable, this Court should set aside 
the default judgment altogether, and allow a trial on the merits to 
proceed. 
Submitted this of 1983. 
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Joseph E. Tesch 
Attorneys for DefendAnt 
CHARLEY JOSEPH 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY mailed a copy of the foregoing Memorandum 
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Joseph c. Rust, Esq. 
2000 Beneficial Life Tower 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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